Introduction
This paper analyses opinions of political self-sacrifice 1 amongst Tibetan refugees, and explores their meaning for wider debates on the evolving relationship between religion and politics in the Tibetan national struggle. This is a particularly pertinent question at present, given the recent prevalence of self-immolation in Tibet and connected debates about whether such protests 'belong to the religious or political sphere' (Buffetrille 2012: 7) . Does approval of self-sacrificial political methodology indicate a secularisation process (Ardley 2002) , or is it simply reflective of the natural fluidity of religion's political influence? This paper supports the latter position, and seeks to explore the current (and potential future) nature of this dynamic relationship further.
It offers insights into the Tibetan political movement through an in-depth study of one refugee community. Evidence is presented from fieldwork in Dharamsala, a Tibetan settlement in north-western India home to the Dalai Lama and approximately eight thousand refugees. Local opinions about self-sacrificial political methods were sought over six months in 2012, through both participant observation and more structured methods including questionnaires and interviews (104 of each). It must be noted that this paper is therefore a case study of this geographical population; it cannot claim to represent the views of the entire Tibetan diaspora. 2 Nevertheless, the choice of Dharamsala is reflective of its status as the hub of Tibetan politics in exile, being the site of the government-in-exile and the base location for most of the prominent activist groups' headquarters.
In terms of the paper's structure, the first section offers a brief overview of the religion-politics relationship in traditional Tibetan culture. The second part then explores the Dalai Lama's views of self-sacrifice, explaining why he rejects it on religious grounds. The third section discusses how political self-sacrifice has been employed by Tibetans in recent years, and considers refugees' positive responses to 1 The term political self-sacrifice, also referred to as self-suffering, is used to mean harm that is willingly accepted, encouraged or inflicted upon the self for political purposes. This study refers in particular to hunger striking and self-immolation.
2 Naturally, this study can make no claim to represent the ideas of Tibetans inside Tibet either. Political restrictions in Tibet make this type of research impossible within its borders.
this. The paper then moves on to pose the next logical question: should the increasing prevalence of political self-sacrifice therefore be considered indicative of a secularising process in the Tibetan context? It is argued that while this may be the case in activist organisations, it is not a sound interpretation for the general population more broadly. Furthermore, it is argued that -contrary to logical inference -this does not imply a straightforward reduction of faith in the Dalai Lama (or his politics) either.
The last section of the paper considers the implications of the research findings for the future of resistance politics in Dharamsala. Although it is impossible to make definitive predictions, it is submitted that the most likely outcome is not secularisation, but perhaps a reconfiguring of religious ideas that maintains the image -if not always the philosophy -of the Dalai Lama.
The role of religion in Tibetan politics in exile
Before the incremental Chinese occupation of Tibet during the 1950s, the Tibetan governance system was chos-srid zung-'brel -'religion and politics combined' Barnett (1994: 245) . For several centuries, the Dalai Lama (he has had fourteen incarnations so far) was 'the only unquestioned leader of the Tibetan people' (Kolas 1996: 57) . This leadership continued in the government-in-exile after the current Dalai Lama fled Chinese-occupied Tibet in 1959, followed by many Tibetans who traversed the Himalayas on foot to reach sanctuary in South Asia. The Tibetan national struggle has been waged from Dharamsala since then, spearheaded by the Dalai Lama and guided by his spiritual perspective on politics.
This perspective has shaped a political movement internationally famed and admired for its rejection of violence and its willingness to compromise. For instance, the fundamental goal of national independence was replaced by regional autonomy as a result of this perspective, and various methods popular in other nonviolent movements have been rejected for being coercive as opposed to being based on the persuasive power of friendship: even boycotts have been ruled out of the official methodology.
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However, based on Tibetan refugees' political activities during the 1990s, Jane Ardley (2002) argues that the increasing acceptance by Tibetans of political selfsacrifice, which the Dalai Lama explicitly rejects, indicates that they are undergoing a process of political secularisation. She further submits that this could (and should) culminate in the removal of the Dalai Lama's influence from people's political thinking altogether, the ejection of religion from political institutions, and the subsequent embrace of standard nonviolent resistance methods (i.e. boycotts, civil disobedience and self-sacrificial methods such as hunger striking) and perhaps even violent ones as well (Ardley 2002 Ardley's (2002) linkage of Tibetans' self-sacrificial political methods with the concept of secularisation, and in particular with the Dalai Lama's decreasing political relevance for Tibetans in exile, remains interesting. Given that her predictions were made on the back of limited levels of self-sacrifice in the Tibetan movement, and the fact that recent years have seen an unprecedented proliferation of self-sacrifice, it seems pertinent now to explore her arguments further.
The rest of this paper will seek to respond to the idea that Tibetan refugees' widespread approval of political self-sacrifice implies their recognition that religion 'has hindered those struggling to free Tibet' (Ardley 2002: 166) and moreover that it represents an express rejection of the Dalai Lama's political opinions, foreshadowing
China into the mainstream of world affairs and try to influence it on the basis of friendship', he said (see http://www.dalailama.com/news/post/936-speaking-about-non-violence-and-thepath-to-peace-and-happiness-in-cambridge). Of course, sceptics would question the extent to which such a statement may actually result from his awareness that international support in such efforts would not be forthcoming. In terms of realpolitik, therefore, it may be regarded as more sensible for the Tibetan leadership to reject such ideas, and in doing so to maintain the (internationally admired) image of Tibetans as innately friendly/non-confrontational. (Victoria 1997 (Victoria , 2010 and even terrorist groups (Schmithausen 1999 Keown's (1992) than it is with Clayton's (2006) . In order to demonstrate this, I would like to quote at length from an interview that Catherine Ingram (1990: 12-13) 
Popular views of political self-sacrifice in Dharamsala
This part of the paper now considers the views of refugees in Dharamsala, and in doing so it problematises the popular image of a Tibetan exile community united under the Dalai Lama's political and spiritual leadership.
As mentioned earlier, the Tibetan government-in-exile has ruled out most direct action protest techniques. The Dalai Lama has understandably discouraged all resistance activities inside Tibetan borders, since punishments inflicted on so-called 7 See Thinley (2007) for the Dalai Lama's full letter.
'splittists' by the Chinese state are known to be extremely severe (e.g. Gyatso 1997; TCHRD 2014) . However, even in exile he has discouraged most nonviolent methods outlined by Gene Sharp (1973) 
i) Hunger strikes
The first of these was in 1977 outside the Chinese embassy in Delhi. That hunger strike was unexpectedly successful, leading the Indian government at the time to pledge support to the Tibetan independence movement. It also enjoyed widespread popular support, with refugees from all over India and Nepal gathering to 'do their bit for the cause' (Norbu 1998: n.p.) . Nevertheless, Dharamsala's leadership publicly condemned this form of action. In 1988 the TYC organised another hunger strike 'to the death,' but the Dalai Lama contacted the strikers personally, asking them to stop, and they did (Norbu 2008) .
The most famous of the TYC hunger strikes to date has been the 1998 strike in Delhi mentioned earlier, this time directed at the UN. There were six strikers, with one hundred more lined up to take their places if they died. A TYC press release on (Shakya 2012a) .
ii) Self-immolations (2009-present) For more than ten years, Ngodup remained the only self-immolating martyr for the Notably, Karin Fierke's (2013) work on political self-sacrifice supports the general view that such acts are socially restorative, legitimating and renewing community dignity and cohesion. Self-sacrifice, she argues, works to reclaim the political capacity/authority of marginalised communities through its evocation of 'sticky' emotion, which affects both local and international audiences. Fierke (2013) therefore suggests that analysis of political self-sacrifice must highlight the concept of performativity; the ability to make a 'speech act' on local and global stages. 'The political weapon', she writes, 'is injury to the body and its performance of a power of resistance…in which the body speaks against the power of its silencing' (Fierke 2013 : 90, italics original).
There is nothing to insist that political self-sacrifice must always be linked to religion in the reassertion of communitas, although Fierke (2013) underscores its common relationship to religious sentiment. Rene Girard, to whom Fierke (2013) refers, has also argued over several decades that the fundamental function of sacrifice is community strengthening, and that its common incorporation in religious systems is reflective of its capacity to achieve this. Although Fierke (2013) She is undoubtedly correct in her observation that the activist community (including members of the TYC and other influential organisations) inhabits a political space distinct from that of the religion-dominated government-in-exile. In a personal interview with a staff member of the TYC in Dharamsala, for example, I was told that to approach political issues from a spiritual perspective means that 'you can't express real opinion. The heart needs to be separate from the head.' The all-India head of another prominent activist group, Students for a Free Tibet, similarly told me that 'we need to differentiate religion from our politics -it's too limiting.' Thus, many activists believe that spiritual beliefs need to be kept apart from political aims and methods; 'after all,' said another TYC member, 'compassion is not helpful in politics.
We have to think in terms of politics: we are political refugees, not religious refugees.'
The suggestion that activist organisations such as the TYC represent a significant break from religious influence is therefore not unreasonable. Nevertheless, it is important not to neglect the complexity of activists' relationship with religion either. In conversation with members of a number of prominent activist organisations in Dharamsala including the TYC, Students for a Free Tibet and Gu Chu Sum, I was told that the sidelining of religious principles is a necessarily pragmatic approach to dealing with the current political situation, which cannot be resolved through means accordant with Buddhist teachings. However, they also regularly emphasised that this sidelining is temporary. For example:
'Religion is the heart of our culture. We are forced to take steps that our culture does not like… in order to save that culture. Later we will certainly return to our traditions of peace. But first we must win that right by other methods.'
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To suggest that the membership of these organisations is largely secular, or even in a straightforward process of secularisation, would therefore be somewhat problematic.
I would like to move on now to think about the 'ordinary' people of Dharamsala -by She continues:
'The hunger strike was a political act, and religious interpretations
should not be applied. In the context of Tibetan politics, this is groundbreaking' (Ardley 2002: 65 However, although it appears that religion and politics are still tightly linked in the minds of Tibetans in Dharamsala, there is one further issue that must be considered here: 'Shangri-la' pressure. In a nutshell, the popular argument that Tibetans are 'prisoners of Shangri-la' (Lopez 1998) emphasises the fact that, as a small group without resources, Tibetans cannot stand up to Chinese dominance alone, and must therefore depend on international support. Dependence on external actors creates a troubling imbalance of power; Tibetans essentially have to 'buy' their support by acting in the ways that the international community expects them to. Anand (2007) argues that the concept of Tibet has long offered a psychological sanctuary for westerners, who have consistently sought to believe in the possibility of a place of genuine peace on Earth (see also Lopez 1994 Lopez , 1998 . As long as Tibetans uphold this image of themselves as passive, spiritual people, they are likely to enjoy significant international popular support (although this has never translated into practical assistance by western states).
With this in mind, one is left to wonder whether the fervent religiosity with which Tibetans in Dharamsala explain acts of self-sacrifice could be reflective of their desire to maintain this 'Shangri-la' image in the international imagination, whether it is a true representation of local religious belief, or whether it is -as seems most likely -a complex combination of both.
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Religious politics without the Dalai Lama?
At this stage in the discussion, I would now like to return to Ardley's (2002) arguments about the future of this movement. She calls for the complete secularization of the political process, which would see the Dalai Lama maintaining a religious role with absolutely no political influence. The discussion above has shown that despite the Dalai Lama's retirement from political affairs in 2011 (nine years after Ardley (2002) made her arguments), people continue to link religion with political activity. However, the question remains: does the fact that people do not share the Dalai Lama's views on self-sacrifice, and yet still emphasize the importance of 20 While I believe that the religious beliefs of Tibetans in Dharamsala are genuine, this does not mean that other aspects of the 'Shangri-la' process are not operating. My experience does not suggest that Tibetans' religious beliefs necessarily make them feel 'innately' nonviolent or peaceful, for example, although they do promote these images of themselves in order to protect their international image. This is a very complex issue that relates not only to political ideas but to psychology, and I cannot do justice to a discussion of it here.
religion in politics, mean that they are rejecting his personal influence over political processes?
It may seem difficult to imagine how people who have complete faith in the omniscience of a religious figure could see fit to disregard his ideas simply because they refer to political issues. People in Dharamsala certainly demonstrate this type of faith in the Dalai Lama in their everyday religious behaviour, and the results of the questionnaire reinforce this observation, with 96.1% of respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement 'whatever the Dalai Lama says is correct.'
How, then, can they see fit to ignore some of his political assertions? The answer to this is inevitably complex. In her study of how human beings engage in political movements in apparently illogical ways, Wolford (2010: 25) emphasizes that we must add the fact that 'people are "confused, life is complicated, emotional and uncertain" to our analyses of social change and mobilization'. Wolford (2010) is building here on Abu-Lughod's (1993 ,2000 argument that social-scientific depictions of communities tend towards the static and homogenous, whereas they should aim to reveal the 'contestatory nature of discourses and social life within all communities' (Abu-Lughod 2000: 263). These are not discourses that compete against each other; they exist in parallel, finding homes in individual minds that manage to incorporate many of them at once, despite their opposing logics.
The main issue here relates to the politics of representation, and specifically to the assumption that 'other' cultures are comprised of uncontested beliefs and ways of doing things. Discursive contestation is in fact fundamental to all cultural groups, and more importantly this is not (only) factional but internal to each person. When we know that people in our own communities change their views/articulations fluidly depending on context and mood, why do we assume that the 'other' does not share this complexity?
The generalization of the 'other' in commentary, including academic writing, is located in power: its origins are in western professional, managerial and administrative processes that organise and control groups of 'others' within our own boundaries (e.g. the poor, women, prisoners). This, Abu-Lughod (1993) observes, is reflected in the social scientist's desire to uncover the 'truth' about the 'other' -the search for its elusive nature, or indeed for its unwavering logic, is dehumanising and rooted in our desire to control. The word 'increasing' is certainly problematic, considering the long-term and widespread positive responses to hunger strikes. Furthermore, it must also be emphasized that as far as the non-activist population goes, the 'willingness to flout the Dalai Lama's stance on non-violence' extends only to subtle interpretations of what constitutes nonviolence, and not to a willingness to reject nonviolence altogether (see Fig. 1 above) . Because the Dalai Lama has been so clear about the need for nonviolence, the vast majority of people are unwilling to compromise on this.
Crucially, their continued insistence on nonviolence is a consequence of the Dalai Lama's teachings rather than just their own strategic judgment. Kolas (1996) and Avedon (1984) globally-recognized figurehead of this movement to liberate 'Shangri -la'), but also in the domestic arena in exile, where Tibetan refugees struggle to maintain a collective identity in an environment where foreign influences abound, and the diaspora is increasingly scattered.
Conclusions: the future of the religion-politics relationship in Dharamsala
As this paper draws to a conclusion, it will now reflect upon what the arguments and findings above imply for the future of Tibetan politics in exile. With the wisdom that hindsight now offers, it is easy to be doubtful of Ardley's (2002: 147) argument that democratization means that 'religion would be removed from practical political affairs.' The reality is that people in Dharamsala continue to seek religious justifications for political acts, perhaps especially when they appear to be in breach of other religious pronouncements.
It also seems reasonable to reject outright the idea that the Dalai Lama could somehow be ejected from the political imagination in Dharamsala. While counterdiscourses may be invoked to allow people to sidestep some of his pronouncements, other discourses are simultaneously maintained to preserve his position as an honoured spiritual leader -a 'God King', as he is often called. Critically, his position is not just that of a figurehead, but rather it is one that inspires deep religious and community sentiment in the population of Dharamsala -two things that are inextricably connected. While it may seem irrational for people to have such a depth of faith in the Dalai Lama whilst simultaneously appearing to ignore some of his political judgements, this must be accepted as an element of the natural fluidity of human cultural instinct.
It must be emphasised, moreover, that the apparent disregard for some of the Dalai Lama's views is located only in the grey areas of his discourse. The Tibetan leader's failure to be consistently explicit in public forums about his reasons for rejecting selfsacrifice creates these grey areas, leaving space for followers to (re)interpret his more general statements without explicitly challenging his traditional authority.
Indeed, it seems likely that these fluid spaces are crucial to the entire relationship between faith and activism in this context. there to remind people regularly of his own views, it will certainly become easier for them to cling to counter discourses that legitimate alternative political methods within the broader cultural framework. Given the current trend, moreover, this seems distinctly likely.
If I were to predict a likely trajectory for this movement, it would be an increasing movement towards Gandhian methods within the broader framework of Tibetan Buddhism. The Dalai Lama is likely to maintain the positions of an object of worship and a symbolically unifying institution, but it seems likely that his rejection of common resistance methods that Gandhi favoured, including self-sacrifice and even extending to coercive tactics such as economic boycotts, may well be 'forgotten' or explained away after his death. The Dalai Lama's admiration for Gandhi, combined with an alternative view of skilful means that could permit virtually any form of political action with 'altruistic' intent (just as Gandhi could justify most acts if they were in the pursuit of 'Truth') has the potential to change how religion and politics interact here in future, while simultaneously preserving the orientalist images of Tibet necessary for international support. However, whether this could ultimately extend to the rejection of the Dalai Lama's central political positions (Ardley 2002) remains to be seen. At this point in time, it can only be concluded that the current prevalence and support of self-sacrifice does not indicate a secularisation process of Tibetan politics in exile, and nor does it indicate a truly significant move away from the Dalai Lama's political influence.
